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FOREWORD

PROFILING PRINCIPLE:
THE PROSECUTION OF WEN

Ho

LEE

AND THE DEFENSE OF ASIAN AMERICANS

Frank H. Wu*

Questions are more important than answers. This Foreword is only an introduction. It is an attempt to present the questions for further discussion.
We should avoid the common question of whether wrongful racial profiling
occurred in the Wen Ho Lee case, because the simplicity of the inquiry conceals the
subtle error of its implication. Like the designation of "Chinese spy" which can refer
to either a spy for China or a spy who is of Chinese descent, the question of whether
wrongful racial profiling occurred in the Wen Ho Lee case confuses two distinct
questions. There is the question of whether racial profiling occurred, and then there
is the question of whether any such racial profiling was wrongful. One is a descriptive question, and the other is a normative question.
The confusion of the factual inquiry with the moral judgment, however, is
hidden in the heart of the controversy over racial profiling. As a consequence of this
confusion, the debate over the Lee case has the two sides arguing different issues.
When the prosecution states, "there was no wrongful racial profiling," they have in
mind the crucial word "wrongful." When the defense states, "there was wrongful
racial profiling," they take for granted that any racial profiling must be deemed
wrongful.
The proponents of the prosecution have had little choice but to concede that
the investigation of Lee in some manner may have relied on race - there has been
too much testimony from insiders to deny at least the strong possibility - and they
have presented a sophisticated version of the argument for rational discrimination.
They have insisted that because mainland China targets potential sources of secret
information from individuals of Chinese ancestry, it makes sense for the counterintelligence operation as a defensive measure to do so as well. The opponents of the
prosecution have concentrated their efforts on arguing that Lee was a victim of a
selective inquiry and double standards. They have had greater difficulty not in
showing that race may have been involved in focusing on Lee, but instead, in explaining why the use of that factor would be wrong if it is logical. (One side is
concerned about issues of national security, and the other side is concerned about
due process; that is another debate altogether, albeit related to racial profiling.)
* Associate Professor of Law and Clinic Director, Howard University. J.D., University of Michigan,
1991; BA., Johns Hopkins University, 1988. The aurhor has previously written on rhe Wen Ho Lee case in
mass media publications. See Theodore Hsien Wang & Frank H. Wu, Singled Out, Based on Race, WASH.
POST, Aug. 30, 2000, a( A25; Frank H. Wu, China: The New Scapegoat, AsIAN WK., May 6, 1999, a( 9;
Frank H. Wu, Come Together for Wen Ho Lee, AsIAN WK., Dec. 23, 1999 a( 9; Frank H. Wu, Even When
Logical, Racial Profiling Has No Piau in U.S., ATIANTA J. & CaNST., July 30,2000, a( G2; Frank H. Wu,
Racial Profiling: A Pan-Ethnic Issue, AsIAN WK., Nov. 25, 1999, at 9.
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The prosecution has the easier case than the defense in this respect: The prosecution can prevail if it either demonstrates that Lee was not treated any differently
than a white counterpart would have been, or that any such difference in treatment
was appropriate. After all, not even the greatest idealists have ever argued that every
individual must be accorded identical treatment by a democratic government under
any conceivable circumstance; distinctions can and must be made. The defense faces
a significant burden: It must not only establish that there was some use of race, but
it must also then plead that even a use of race under circumstances that seem as
compelling as any government would ever be able to demonstrate nonetheless remams Improper.
In the actual debate, each side has made an unwarranted assumption. The
prosecution advocates have assumed that a utilitarian calculus should be used to
achieve justice: They appear content to show the rationality of the use of race, under
the assumption that what is rational is by definition right. The defense advocates
have assumed that absolute civil rights are necessary to ensure justice: They seem
willing to show that the use of race by itself is enough to warrant condemnation of
the practice.
The prosecution argument can be refuted by several means. Most obviously, its
cost-benefit methodology can be accepted but its particular analysis rejected. It is
especially utilitarians who would be appalled at the poor use of their technique. The
Lee investigation failed to achieve its own stated objectives. While Lee may have
been guilty of minor offenses, the government itself was forced to concede that he
was not the so-called "Chinese spy" and never transferred secrets to any foreign
power. As is typical of instances of racial profiling and abuse of prosecutorial power,
Lee was investigated for something altogether different from that which he was indicted; it was not simply a lesser charge but an unrelated one. The charges had
nothing to do with an intentional transfer of information to China. The Lee investigation also produced unanticipated externalities: Potential Asian immigrant and
Asian American employees avoided the labs, and cutrent employees reconsidered
whether they wished to stay there, both of which are detrimental to the government
in recruiting talented employees.
In addition, utilitarianism is subject to all the usual attacks. In this particular
context, utilitarianism is vulnerable to the familiar argument that civil rights by their
nature, and any rights, cannot be trumped by the results of mere accounting. Rights
are incommensurable in the marketplace. They cannot be readily quantified, and
they defY comparison. If an anti-discrimination principle has any meaning at all, it
must be at its most effective when it is least attractive. Otherwise, the right is not
even a privilege.
There also is a peculiar problem in the Lee case. The perpetual foreigner syndrome that afflicts Asian Americans in general affects Lee in particular. The perpetual foreigner assumption - that Asians are sojourners, visitors, and/or guests who
cannot overcome an inherent alien status - makes it easy to deprive Asian Americans
of civil rights. Asian Americans are not integrated into a paradigm of civil rights
because the poor treatment accorded Asian Americans is based not on their race but
on their alienage, and therefore is acceptable.
A consensus has developed that discrimination on the basis of race is improper.
A consensus remains, however, that discrimination on the basis of citizenship is
proper. Citizens may enter the country; foreigners must seek permission. Indeed,
serious theorists contend that the sovereignty of the nation and the meaning of
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citizenship status - ideas that undoubtedly have real consequence as matters of law
and culture - cannot exist without a distinction between citizens and aliens that
favors the former and literally disenfranchises the latter. Of course, the crux of the
perpetual foreigner syndrome is race and not alienage. Race has been equated with
alienage either by definition or as a proxy. Asian racial background is correlated to
foreign status - the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Asiatic Barred Zone, and the racial
prerequisite to naturalization enforced in the Ozawa! and Thintf cases were the de
jure version of this phenomenon. "Where are you really from?", "How do you like it
in our country?", "When are you going home?", and "If you don't like it here, you
can go back to where you came from," are the de facto version of it.
Here, the perpetual foreigner syndrome expresses itself in an especially acute
manner. Strucrurally, the "Chinese look for spies among Chinese Americans" argument as a justification for selecting Lee is identical to that presented for the Japanese
American Internment. It is the proposition that the United States government can
deprive its citizens of their civil rights because a hostile power has taken certain
actions. It also can be interpreted as allowing a foreign government such as China or
Japan to divest United States citizens of their rights. Described from this perspective, it appears more absurd, especially because it is unlikely that most Americans
would accept a similar forfeiture of their own rights based on the activities of another country. Yet the Lee case was rarely viewed from this angle, perhaps because
Lee himself was treated rhetorically as if he were a foreigner rather than a citizen.
However, the defense argument suffers because Lee's supporters responded in
turn with their own utilitarian arguments and, in some instances, were offended by
the more robust case they could have presented. The conventional argument for Lee
was premised on the irrationality of pursuing him. The reasoning proceeded along
the following lines: There is no reason to suppose that Lee would be a spy for China
because of his race.
This approach suffers from major flaws. Inevitably, if the approach is to be
more than an assertion taken on faith, it degenerates into an empirical debate,
namely whether it is rational or irrational to believe that there is some slightly higher
likelihood that a person of Chinese heritage would betray the United States to
China, than a person who is basically the same save for his or her heritage. Because
a significant amount of the information used to consider the question is classified
and because of the usual problems of imperfect knowledge, this contest turns out to
proceed in the abstract and with assumptions. Moreover, to argue that it is irrational to single out Lee suggests that if it is rational, it is permissible.
In other words, the defense advances an argument only for instrumental behavior. It is a plea that the government remain rational about conduct, not a demand
that the government respect civil rights. An argument for rationality is ineffective if
there is a fundamental disagreement about what is rational, which is bound to occur
if there is even modest pluralism. People can and are likely to agree to behave rationally, but even a sincerely shared preference for rationality does not necessarily
produce the same sense of rationality and, to some extent, excludes the possibility of
multiple options within a reasonable range.
1. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding that a Japanese immigrant was not a "free
white person" eligible (0 naturalize as a citizen).
•
2. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that an Indian immigrant was not a "free
white person" eligible (0 naturalize as a citizen).
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The better approach is more critical of the government, not less critical. The
better approach, however, requires a concession for the sake of argument. Although
some are not willing to make this concession, such an inability to make concessions
reflects a commitment to ideology that is not strategic. The concession is that it is
reasonable (or, to present it in a milder form, it is not absurd) to believe that there is
some slightly higher likelihood that a person of Chinese heritage would betray the
United States to China, rather than a person who is basically the same save for his or
her heritage. Or consider the mildest means of expressing a similar line of reasoning.
It is not absurd to believe that there is some slightly higher likelihood that a person
of Chinese heritage can speak a Chinese dialect than a person who is basically the
same save for his or her heritage. Or to use an example with statistical support
beyond doubt, a majority of Asians in the United States are foreign-born, not merely
that a higher percentage of Asians than whites are foreign-born; thus, any effort by
the government to sort out who is foreign-born could rely on Asian background
with better than fifty percent accuracy.
The case that incorporates any of these concessions is stronger than the case
that does not. It is stronger because it renders irrelevant the opposing side's empirical argument. It also is stronger because it makes significant the notion of rights.
Once this concession has been made, the genuine issues have been joined. The
real debate can be conducted. That debate is whether in those rare instances where
racial discrimination is, in fact, rational discrimination - there are examples from
which we can infer probabilities with a degree of certainty as Bayesian statistical
analysis would suggest - it is a course of action we as a society wish to sanction.
There are other interesting questions, but they are empirical questions: Do the
premises obtain? Do people engage in preference falsification? Do they behave in
bad faith? Are there countervailing costs? Are there opportunity costs in the failure
to act? Even after irrational discrimination has been defeated, the possibility of rational discrimination can be threatening.
In legal terms, this debate concerns the difference between "rationality" review
and "strict scrutiny" review. The levels of judicial intervention in majoritarian
processes may differ only as procedural devices, allocating the burden of proof to the
citizen in "rationality" review and the government in "strict scrutiny" review, recognizing in each instance certain presumptions and fictions. Or they may differ as
substantive standards, so that the evidence that would satisfy the less demanding
"rationality" review would not pass the more rigorous "strict scrutiny" review. In
such a regime, an application of a Bayesian formula would be sufficient for "rationality" review. By itself, it would fail "strict scrutiny" review because of the requirements of "compelling state interest" and "least restrictive means" ("narrow
tailoring"). If "rationality" review and "strict scrutiny" review are to be distinguished, with the latter made more than a burden-shifting procedure, racial profiling
cannot pass muster solely by its rationality (the naming of "rationality" review as
such is not accidental).
The Lee case also should prompt Asian Americans to realize a number of features of contemporary racial dynamics. These may be new to Asian Americans (and,
for that matter, non-academics), but they are established insights applied to new
contexts.
The inquiry as to whether Lee had committed a crime on the one hand, and
the inquiry as to whether he was able to assert his civil rights and whether he was
given due process on the other hand, are different inquiries, but the former must be
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considered subordinate to the latter. The guilt-innocence inquiry cannot be pursued
with justice unless and until the civil rights-due process inquiry has been resolved. A
reversal of priorities, with the civil rights-due process matter deferred, ensures that a
guilty judgment will dominate the discourse even if it is likely to be faulty. It sets
the inordinately high threshold of requiring an absolutely pure party as the challenger to systemic problems.
The persecution of Lee can occur without any intentional wrongdoers but can
become racial, thanks to a volatile combination of factors ranging from partisan
politics and the institutional goals of media outlets, to official indifference and the
stereotypical images of popular culture. The United States Attorney ultimately responsible for the Lee case was Chinese American. The Secretary of Energy who
initially approved the choices in the Lee case was the highest-ranking Latino in the
federal government. The Clinton administration was liberal, and it had even promoted progressive rules against racial profiling. It boasted more Asian Americans
among its ranks than any other executive branch, by an order of magnitude. Other
than perhaps one individual, Notra Trulock, as to whom press reports suggested a
pattern of previous bias, none of the persons involved could be accused with much
foundation of being a "racist."
The Lee case also requires Asian Americans to consider again the value of multiracial coalitions and to redouble their efforts toward such coalitions. Asian Americans were moderately successful in maintaining pan-Asian coalitions, even though
Japanese Americans with memories of the internment identified with Chinese Americans much more visibly than with other Asian ethnicities. Asian Americans were
largely unsuccessful in connecting Wen Ho Lee to "driving while black." Some
actively tried to distinguish Lee, as an unassuming scientist, from drug dealers, preferring an image of middle-class conformity while avoiding association with stereotypes of people of color. Some Asian American commentary implied that racial
profiling of Asian Americans was altogether different from that applied to African
Americans. Ironically, Asian Americans appeared largely unaware of the possibility
that their selective concern would confirm the accusation that Asian Americans were
acting out of ethnic solidarity.
The lawyers who represented Lee, however, deserve the utmost respect. They
won for a client and a cause when virtually all observers, however sympathetic,
would have dismissed their prospects while wishing them well. They vindicated Lee,
charged with theft of the nation's nuclear "crown jewels," and equated him to the
Rosenbergs, who were sentenced to death during the Cold War era - making him a
martyr and shaming his tormentors. The greatest testament to their practical victory
would be principled policies.
If legal academics have any practical contribution to make to public discourse,
it is in pointing out the hard questions. This Foreword has highlighted the hard
questions. The attempts to answer follow.

